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Abstract 
 
This paper examines an ongoing intervention in sanitation in informal settlements in 
Mumbai, India.  The Slum Sanitation Programme (SSP) is premised upon 
„partnership‟, „participation‟ and „cost-recovery‟ in the delivery of large toilet blocks 
as a practical solution to the stark lack and inadequacy of sanitation, and offers an 
opportunity to interrogate a growing consensus on sanitation provision among 
mainstream development agencies.  The paper argues for a more flexible approach to 
policy infrastructure, technical infrastructure, and cost recovery in urban sanitation 
interventions.  The paper also considers whether the SSP, as the largest city project of 
its nature in Indian history, marks a shift in the relationship between the state and the 
„slum‟ in Mumbai.  It suggests that despite constituting a change from ad hoc 
sanitation provision to a more sustained and universal policy, informal settlements in 
the SSP remain populations outside the sphere of citizenship and notions of the clean, 
ordered modern city. 
 
Introduction 
 
This paper examines an ongoing intervention in sanitation in informal settlements in 
Mumbai, India.  The Slum Sanitation Programme (SSP) – the most ambitious urban 
sanitation intervention in Indian history – is premised upon „partnership‟, 
„participation‟ and „cost-recovery‟ in the delivery of large toilet blocks as a practical 
solution to the stark lack and inadequacy of sanitation in Mumbai‟s informal 
settlements.  The SSP marks a significant change in the provision of sanitation 
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infrastructure in the city.  The paper reflects on the progress of the SSP by considering 
three key features of the programme: first, its policy infrastructure; second, its 
technical infrastructure, and third, its use of user charges as a basis for „cost-recovery‟.  
The SSP provides an opportunity to explore a growing consensus on sanitation 
provision among mainstream development agencies to focus on partnership, 
participation and cost-recovery.   
 
The paper argues for a more flexible approach to policy infrastructure, technical 
infrastructure, and cost recovery in sanitation interventions in informal settlements.  In 
these three areas, the paper does not seek to settle a set of issues, but to contribute to 
debate around the SSP.  In addition, the paper seeks to contribute to more general 
debates both on urban sanitation in informal settlements and on urban development.  
Much has been made of the notions of partnership and participation by mainstream 
development institutions in recent years.  They are buzzwords in the planning and 
implementation of interventions globally, associated with what can be described as a 
„post-Washington consensus‟ or a „revised neoliberal position‟ (Mohan and Stokke, 
2000).  This position reflects a cautious approach to the earlier view that the market 
could deliver development, and emphasises the role of an efficient and transparent 
state as a facilitator of development, with civil society as an implementer (Pieterse, 
2001; Jenkins, 2002; UN Habitat, 2003: 224-264).   
 
Notwithstanding the relative neglect of sanitation by mainstream development 
agencies and governments over the years, recent years have witnessed a shift in the 
nature of formal efforts to provide sanitation to informal settlements, with a growing 
emphasis by development agencies on „community-driven‟ sanitation initiatives (UN 
 4 
Habitat, 2003).  International development agencies increasingly argue that effective 
sanitation provision in informal settlements in low and middle-income countries must 
centre on “community mobilization” and seek to “create support and ownership” 
within settlements (UN Millennium Project, 2005: 1-2).  Similarly, the 2003 World 
Development Report argues that „community participation‟ is a prerequisite for 
success (World Bank, 2003).  The World Bank has made this logic a prerequisite of 
funding for the SSP.  In addition, as is increasingly the case in urban sanitation 
interventions (Davis, 2006), the SSP charges people for use in order to reduce 
subsidies and help engender what various agents on the programme view as a „sense of 
community ownership‟.  In terms of technical infrastructure, the paper will reflect on 
the difficulties with the toilet blocks in the SSP, and in terms of user charges the paper 
will suggest that a more informed and cautious approach may be necessary.  As with 
the case of policy infrastructure, the paper will argue that a more flexible approach 
based on the diverse social geographies of informal settlements could be fruitful. 
 
Despite a large literature on urban sanitation in India (for instance, Bapat and Agarwal, 
2003; Chaplin, 1999; Davis, 2004; Hobson, 2000; Kundu, 1993; Patel, forthcoming) 
and more generally (for instance, Melosi, 2000; Pellow, 2002), there has been little 
investigation of sanitation in Mumbai.  Launched in 1997, the SSP is a „demand-
driven‟ programme that aims to treat slum dwellers “as initiators, collaborators and 
resources to build on” (BMC, no date: 9).  The programme has the long-term aim of 
ensuring adequate sanitation is provided to all people living in informal settlements 
before 1995 by 2025.  It aims to provide one toilet seat for every 50 people, and 
generally takes the form of large toilet blocks.  The SSP is often portrayed as a shift 
from a model of state provision of sanitation in Mumbai to a model that is 
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“participatory and demand-driven in nature” (World Bank, 1995: 123; Sanyal and 
Mukhija, 2001).  The Brihanmumbai Municipal Corporation (BMC), using World 
Bank credit and matching funds from the state (Maharashtra) government, pays for 
water, sewer and electricity connections, and provides land.  Contractors – 
nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) and engineering firms – are responsible for 
building the blocks.  After construction, the contractor maintains the block for one 
year on behalf of the „community‟, and then local Community Based Organisations 
(CBOs) manage the blocks through a corpus fund that local people donate to, 
generally, on a monthly basis.  Maintenance generally takes the form of a paid local 
caretaker, who often lives on the second floor of the block with his family and who is 
usually from a deprived caste (Black and Talbot, 2005; Pathak, 1991).   
 
The paper will proceed by locating the SSP in the broader relationship between the 
state and „slum‟ in Mumbai.  It will then discuss the nature of sanitation in Mumbai‟s 
informal settlements, before considering the SSP‟s policy infrastructure, technical 
infrastructure and principle of cost recovery.  In conclusion, it will consider the role of 
the SSP in the state-„slum‟ relation.  The paper is based on fieldwork conducted in 
Mumbai between November 2005 and April 2006 comparing, among other things, 
sanitation conditions in different informal settlements, and is part of an ongoing 
research programme that explores the relationship between the everyday use of 
infrastructure in informal settlements and the state.  In addition to fieldwork, the 
tentative reflections on sanitation and the SSP programme presented in the paper draw 
on the work of researchers based at Mumbai‟s Tata Institute for Social Sciences (Tata, 
1998; Sharma and Bhide, 2005), as well as on joint research by a Mumbai NGO – 
Youth for Unity and Voluntary Action (YUVA) - and consultancy Montgomery 
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Watson (MW-YUVA, 2000; 2001).   
 
The state and informal settlements in Mumbai 
 
The World Bank recently flew in a group of experts to solve Bombay‟s sanitation crisis…The bank‟s 
solution was to propose building 100,000 public toilets.  It was an absurd idea.  I have seen public 
latrines in the slums.  None of them work.  People defecate all around the toilets, because the pits have 
been clogged for months or years.  To build 100,000 public toilets is to multiply this problem a 
hundredfold.  Indians do not have the same civic sense as, say, Scandinavians. 
Suketu Mehta (2004: 118). 
 
Mumbai, formerly Bombay
1, is an island city located on India‟s west coast connected 
to the mainland through a series of bridges.  With a population of 16 million people, it 
is the largest city in India and one of the largest in the world (Swaminathan, 2003: 81).  
The city‟s economy, particularly the southwest area of Nariman Point, has 
increasingly globalised since the economic liberalisation reforms in 1985 and 1991.  
The city is responsible for over half of India‟s foreign trade (Wagh, 2004: 41), has 
become a centre for India‟s global dealings in financial and producer services (Grant 
and Nijman, 2004: 331), and constitutes 40% of the country‟s annual direct central 
revenue (Rajeev, 2005: 27).  It is the capital of the state of Maharashtra, the state with 
the highest-ranking per capita income in India (Kamdar, 2005: 28), and constitutes 
20% of the state‟s GDP (Bombay First, 2003: 12).   
                                                          
1
 Bombay was renamed Mumbai in 1995 by the state government controlled by the Hindu 
fundamentalist party Shiv Sena, which currently controls the municipal corporation.  This renaming has 
been part of a volatile debate around the identity of the city, nationalism and ethnicity (Appadurai 
2000; Hansen 2001). 
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If Mumbai is often spoken and written of as India‟s „most modern city‟ (Rao, 2006), 
this discourse has taken a new turn with the emergence of a new managerial and 
technical elite associated with the growth of global financial services in particular 
parts of the city (Grant and Nijman, 2002).  The geographies of these groups are 
increasingly segregated and exclusive, reflecting new spaces of global connection and 
local disconnection, and are often associated with particular images of what the 
modern Indian city should look like.  There has been an important role in this regard 
for the “intensified circulation of images of global cities through cinema, television, 
and the internet”, and through the increasing tendency of the elite and middle classes 
to travel globally (Chatterjee, 2004: 143).  The state is increasingly seeking to attract 
investment and to develop infrastructure that will facilitate new globalising service 
and financial industries.  Recent years have witnessed intense debates around the 
transformation of public space, provoked particularly by an increasing corpratisation 
of space that has followed India‟s economic liberalisation reforms.  For example, a 
recent controversial ruling by the Supreme Court will see two-thirds of the vacant 
„mill lands‟ in the centre of the city transformed not into social housing as many had 
hoped but into shopping malls and corporate entertainment (for a review of the decline 
of the mills, see D‟Monte, 2002).   
 
Despite the city‟s impressive economic statistics, one influential report argues that 
Mumbai is in “reverse gear” in terms of economic growth and quality of life, noting a 
drop of 7% to 2.4% in the city‟s GDP per annum between 1994 and 2002, and 
highlighting the increasing number of people living in informal settlements, alongside 
growing anxieties over congestion and pollution (Bombay First, 2003: 12).  Others 
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have pointed out that the city‟s economic growth has been highly uneven, restricted to 
wealthy groups and areas of the city.   
 
Over half of the city‟s population lives in informal settlements of varying 
infrastructure, income, economy, ethnicity and religion, squeezed into whatever space 
can be found from bridges and railways to pavements and shantytowns.  The growth in 
informal settlements reflects both the spectacular rise in real estate prices during the 
1990s driven by the city‟s economic growth (Appadurai, 2000), and the inadequacy of 
the state‟s social housing commitment (Verma, 2002).  Most people in informal 
settlements lack security of tenure, live in poor quality housing vulnerable to monsoon 
rains, suffer from frequent bouts of state or private demolition, lack access to sufficient 
and clean water and sanitation facilities, and live in highly polluted environments 
vulnerable to illness and disease.  As the informal population continues to grow 
(Swaminathan, 2003), the task of providing adequate infrastructure becomes more 
challenging.  Given that there is often a weak relationship between income and access 
to basic services and infrastructures in Mumbai‟s informal settlements (Swaminathan, 
2003), it is unlikely that economic growth itself could be a solution to these issues 
(Mitlin and Satterthwaite, 2004).   
 
In the quote that opens this section, Mehta, author of the popular Maximum City: 
Bombay Lost and Found, echoes comments made by Indian colonialists and 
nationalists alike in suggesting that there is something intrinsic to Indian culture that 
precludes the growth of civic consciousness (Chakrabarty, 2002).  Mehta‟s 
denouncement of the SSP, particularly remarkable considering that the scheme is 
concerned with basic social welfare, is not just an expression of pointlessness, but a 
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complaint that the scheme will actually make sanitation conditions in the city worse.   
In this comment – and there have been many like it in the past – „slum‟ is positioned 
as hopeless urban melancholia (Hansen, 2006).  Moreover, in debates around public 
space in urban India, in which „slum‟ inhabits a contentious space, people living in 
informal settlements are often depicted as „problem‟ rather than „citizen‟.   
 
Chatterjee (2004) has argued, amongst others (e.g. Verma, 2002), that people living in 
informal settlements are not treated on a par with „proper citizens‟.  In part, there are 
legal reasons for this.  A full recognition of legitimacy by the state to informal 
settlements in their illegal occupation of land would threaten the structure of legally 
held property.  However, for urban authorities there are important social, economic 
and political reasons for extending services to the poor, ranging from ethnic ties and 
the availability of low-cost labour to the readiness of, in Mumbai‟s case, the city‟s 
largest voting population to support particular political candidates.  As a result, a range 
of services and facilities are “extended on a case-to-case, ad hoc, or exceptional basis, 
without jeopardizing the overall structure of legality and property” (Chatterjee, 2004: 
137).   
 
These services are focussed on populations rather than citizens, in the terrain of what 
Chatterjee calls the „heterogeneous social‟ rather than the homogeneous social of 
citizenship.  The „slum‟ emerges as a demographic targeted for welfare, set apart from 
the homogeneous space of citizenship where rights may be expected, and provided to 
on a haphazard and piecemeal fashion.  In contrast to the domain of citizenship, 
populations do not bear any inherent moral claim on the state.  The policies and 
interventions that take place in this context, in what Chatterjee refers to as political 
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society, should be understood as “an attempt to calibrate rewards and costs, incentives 
and punishments, in order to produce the desired outcomes.  Thus, slums may be 
provided with sanitation in the exception that slum-dwellers would not dirty in the 
streets or parks” (Chatterjee, 2004: 137-8).  
 
Prior to the SSP, toilet blocks were provided on an ad hoc basis through city MP, 
MLA (Members of the Legislative Assembly, Maharashtra state), or city corporator 
funds, often reflecting voting patterns or ethnic and religious ties.  The SSP is an 
attempt to alter the agents and practices of sanitation delivery, constituting a change in 
the relationship between state and „slum‟, and is in part a reaction to a sense that the 
ad hoc model is failing to reach large numbers.  It is also driven by a sense that 
communities would be more effective in toilet block maintenance than the state 
because through participation in the SSP they would have a stake in the blocks.   
 
The municipal corporation‟s budget for sanitation has grown exponentially in recent 
years, driven by state and donor concerns around public health within settlements.  
Public health concerns emerge more from the state and civil society campaigners than 
from middle class fears of disease and illness.  Despite sporadic concerns in different 
parts of the city, the middle classes, as in many Indian cities, are generally able to 
insulate themselves from infection (Chaplin 1999).  On the contrary, many middle-
class neighbourhood organisations in Mumbai, such as many of the increasingly 
popular Advanced Locality Management groups, interpret the sanitising of urban 
space through a logic of demolition rather than one of improvement of informal 
settlements.  They often campaign to “rid the city of encroachers and polluters and, as 
it were, to give the city back to its proper citizens” (Chatterjee, 2004: 140).   
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While the SSP is a regulatory intervention, it is important to note that because the 
„slum‟ inhabits a grey area between legality and illegality, and because of its 
contentious focus in debates about public space, state (and private) interventions are 
often just as likely to take the form of violence.  If Mumbai is often described as 
„India‟s most modern city‟, it is also often simultaneously described as a city at the 
limit, a maximum city (Mehta, 2004).  The „slum‟ haunts both these depictions.  It is 
in part because of this relationship that we see both welfare-oriented interventions 
such as the SSP on the one hand, and violent acts of state demolition on the other.  
These strategies overlap; it is not uncommon for settlements to be part of, for instance, 
the SSP, and also be subject to demolition.  These disparate strategies, of course, have 
different logics, histories and often involve different agents, but together they 
constitute the changing and often unpredictable field of relations between state and 
informal settlement.   
 
In Mumbai, the demolition of informal settlements became increasingly coded by a 
politics of ethnicity during the 1990s, reflected in the rise of the Shiv Sena (Shivaji‟s 
Army), the regionalist Hindu fundamentalist ruling party in the BMC who took the 
state and city in the 1995 elections (Hansen, 2001; Punwani, 2003).  The Shiv Sena 
has long argued that immigrants in informal settlements are the main reason for 
Maharashtrians being unemployed, and has consistently invoked the figure of the 
migrant and the Muslim as a source of crime and social disorder.  In recent years, 
however, the mass programme of demolition of post-2000 informal settlements has 
been coded less by ethnicity than politico-corporate Mumbai‟s self-declared trajectory 
to become the „next Shanghai‟ by 2013 (Bombay First, 2003).   
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An estimated 90,000 huts were torn down during the winter of 2004-2005, leaving 
some 350,000 people homeless and without alternative accommodation.  The January 
1
st
 2000 cut-off was set by the state-run Slum Rehabilitation Authority, and is an 
arbitrary date (recently moved following protests from 1995, which remains the cut-
off for eligibility in the SSP) that allows the state government and municipal 
corporation to ignore or remove more recent settlements.  It is in the cut-off date that 
we see formal acknowledgement by the state of its approach to „slums‟ as 
simultaneously violent and regulatory, sovereign and disciplinary.  Indeed, the cut-off 
date can be interpreted as an attempt to resolve this contradiction.  Although outwith 
the scope of this paper, understanding the operation of violence is critical to 
understanding the changing nature of governance, rights and citizenship in 
contemporary Mumbai (Rao, 2006).  Before going on to reflect on the SSP based on 
recent fieldwork and literature, I will give a brief overview of sanitation conditions in 
the city‟s informal settlements. 
 
Sanitation in Mumbai’s informal settlements 
 
In Bhabrekar Nagar, in the northwest suburb of Malad, three small toilet blocks of 10 
seats each provide for 4000 people.  They were constructed before the SSP using the 
welfare fund of a local MP who contributed a sum of Rs. 1 lakh (£1,180)
2
 for the three 
blocks.  Now, local people are frustrated at the lack of maintenance.  The toilets are 
not connected to the sewer, and the aqua-privy system blocks regularly.  There is no 
                                                          
2
 At the time of writing, £1 was equivalent to Rs. 84, while $1 was equivalent to Rs. 46.  Rs. 1 lakh is 
equivalent to Rs. 100,000, and Rs. 1 crore is equivalent to Rs. 10 million. 
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water connection (water is collected from a bore well) or electricity connection, so the 
blocks are not used at night.  The poor condition of the blocks, combined with 
frequently long queues, means that half the people in the area routinely use the nearby 
jangal (uncultivated land), among fields and trees.  Many of the woman said that they 
preferred to be in an open space than to use an unclean toilet, even though this makes 
them more vulnerable to harassment.  The toilets are maintained at Rs 10 per month 
per household, which funds one caretaker.   
 
The blocks are a source of tension with an adjacent informal settlement that has 
appeared in the last few years.  The settlement – Ambuj Dadi – is using the blocks, 
leading to increased waiting time and uncleanliness. The local committee that 
maintains the blocks tried putting locks on the doors, but they were broken.  Figure 1 
shows the toilet block on the dividing line between Bhabrekar Nagar and Ambuj Dadi.  
Ambuj Dadi is striking in its contrast to Bhabrekar Nagar.  There are no toilets, no 
water supply, no garbage collection, no electricity, and less space.  Housing is 
sackcloth.  The area around Bhabrekar Nagar reveals the extent of variation in living 
conditions in Mumbai.  In the space of one kilometer, housing and infrastructure vary 
from sackcloth, to tin, to brick, to multi-story apartments.  People are located next to 
infrastructures that they cannot use, and the use of these infrastructures (especially 
toilets and water) has become a contentious issue.  Informal settlements can be 
intensely territorial, divided along lines of ethnicity, religion, economic functioning 
and time of and place of migration (Benjamin, 2004; Verma, 2002).  This can lead to a 
competition for resources that politicians often exploit for electoral gain.   
 
Figure 1: Bhabrekar Nagar and Ambuj Dadi  
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These contrasting spaces at Malad point to both the inequalities in sanitation across 
Mumbai and its inadequacy in informal settlements.  Globally, less than one-third of 
the population in most urban centres in Africa, Asia and Latin America are provided 
by what the UN has referred to as „good quality sanitation‟, and as many as 100 
million urban dwellers world-wide are forced to defecate in the open or into waste 
paper or plastic bags because public toilets are not available, too distant or too 
expensive (UN Habitat, 2003: xvii).  In Mumbai, the pressures of sanitation are most 
starkly posed for the six million people living in informal settlements, constituting 
54% of the population and crammed into 1959 slum settlements occupying 8% of the 
land (MW-YUVA, 2001).  Most of these settlements lack systems for disposal of 
excreta, sewage, sullage (water from washing and bathing) and solid wastes, 
constituting significant health and environmental dangers.  Specifically, the disposal of 
human waste is major problem (Swaminathan, 2003: 94).  A 2001 survey of all 24 
wards in the city provided a picture of sanitation in Mumbai‟s informal settlements 
that was to form a basis of the SSP.   
 
The survey found that 63% of the city‟s informal population - 3.92 million people - 
was dependent exclusively on public toilets for their sanitation needs (MW-YUVA, 
2001: 17).  While the average ratio of persons per toilet seat in informal settlements 
was 81:1, the variation went from 273:1 in A ward to 56:1 in F/S and S wards, often 
resulting in queues lasting two hours or more (MW-YUVA, 2001: 4).  It found that 
men often get preference in use of blocks in the morning; women are often forced to 
wait until late morning when they are finished household work.  A disproportionate 
share of the labour and the burden of ill health related to sanitation inadequacies fall 
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on women (Bapat and Agarwal, 2003: 71).  Not only is there the humiliation of going 
to the toilet in full public view (which often results in women waiting until cover of 
darkness, and even to eat and drink less to reduce the chances of going during the 
day), there is also the threat from water-borne diseases, and the ecology of odours and 
channels “where cooking water, washing water, and shit-bearing water are not 
carefully segregated” (Appadurai, 2002: 39).   
 
While the informal settlements on BMC owned land (just under half the informal 
population) were the most provided for, most existing toilet blocks were found to be 
largely lacking in facilities essential for their proper functioning.  Running water, 
electricity and wastebins, squatting pans for children, urinals and bathrooms, were 
often either missing or in poor condition.  One estimate has since suggested that one in 
every three toilet blocks provided through city MP, MLA, or city corporator funds are 
dysfunctional within six months due to overuse and inadequate water supply (Lewis, 
2004).  According to the 2001 survey, only 39% of the blocks had electricity, in most 
cases provided at the initiative of local people, where the households using the toilet 
block have illegally extended the electricity supply from a house and agree to share the 
monthly bill (MW-YUVA, 2001: 35).  Just 14% of the blocks had a water supply of 
any kind – legal of illegal – due to the costs involved (ibid).  An estimated 31% were 
connected to the sewer system, with the rest operating through septic tanks or aqua-
privy systems that frequently block due to high pressures (ibid).  This compares with a 
figure of 45% for major cities in Asia more generally (UN Habitat, 2003: 9).    
 
The cleaning of blocks by BMC conservancy staff was found to be sporadic, and there 
were many cases where staff had to be bribed to do the work.  A common alternative 
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is often in the form of a „sweeper‟ who is privately appointed by local people for 
cleaning the toilets.  The majority of people in informal settlements pay for their 
toilets.  The range of payment varied from Rs. 5 per month to Rs. 100 per month, with 
the majority (91%) of households making a payment of less than Rs. 15 per month 
(MW-YUVA, 2001: 20).  The total slum population forced to defecate in the open was 
estimated at 1.78 million (28%) (MW-YUVA, 2001: 18).   
 
With the data from the survey, settlements were to be prioritised according to need in 
the SSP.  However, while progress sped-up, and some settlements were privileged due 
to need, the „demand-driven‟ nature of the programme has meant that settlements that 
have approached the BMC have been privileged.  Inevitably, areas with very active 
CBOs are in a better position to approach the Mumbai Sewage Disposal Programme 
(MSDP) - the BMC department that runs the SSP - than areas without.  For example, 
an informal settlement at Cheeta Camp in northeast Mumbai was prioritised because 
of an active CBO, even though the number and condition of available toilets was 
better than in other nearby areas (Tata, 1998).  Areas that don‟t approach the MSDP 
simply don‟t get any provision through the scheme.  In the next three sections I will 
reflect on three of the most important features of the scheme: first, the policy 
infrastructure; second, the technical infrastructure; and third, the principle of paying 
for use. 
 
Partnership, participation and toilet blocks 
 
The BMC, and the large NGO involved in the programme – the Society for Promotion 
of Area Resource Centres (SPARC) - often describe the SSP as an example of 
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community empowerment and revival.  BMC officials speak of a “sense of 
ownership” and “belonging – that toilet belongs to me”.  One BMC report claims that 
there is a “high level of satisfaction among the users” and that there is a “sense of 
community ownership among user community groups” (BMC, no date: 23). To be 
sure, many people talk with pride about a well-run toilet block, and involvement with 
the SSP can be a spur for other public health activities.  There are cases where toilet 
blocks have become community centres, where upstairs meeting areas or caretakers 
rooms have become spaces to teach children who work as child labourers and don‟t 
attend school, to hold nursery schools or computer classes, or to have CBO meetings.  
However, it appears that in practice very few people within settlements are involved in 
design and maintenance.  In this section, I will provisionally consider how discourses 
of partnership and participation operate in practice in the SSP by drawing on recent 
literature.  This discussion will not be a review of the performance of CBO 
maintenance; this is a subject of future research.  Given that most of the SSP blocks 
have been open for just one to three years, it is too early to say with certainty whether 
maintenance is more effective than with blocks in the past, and initial research has 
indicated mixed results.       
 
The participatory approach in the SSP was a pre-condition of World Bank funding.  
As Sharma and Bhide (2005: 1785), who have conducted interview-based research on 
all of the agencies involved in the project, have written: “The inherent assumption here 
has been that the NGOs and CBOs to be involved in the SSP were accountable, non-
corrupt and pro-people”.  The implementation of the SSP was phased out in four 
stages: publicity and selection of communities; demand assessment and preparation of 
plans for operation and maintenance; design and construction; and operation and 
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maintenance by the beneficiaries through CBOs.  The first phase (publicity) involved 
four NGOs and revealed a lack of enthusiasm for the scheme: “Out of the 141 targeted 
communities, 105 (75 per cent) were not willing to join the SSP at all. Only nine 
communities reported 76 per cent of their members willing to join the SSP
3
.  In all, 19 
communities applied for the programme. Among these, only nine communities paid 
the upfront contribution” (Sharma and Bhide, 2005: 1785).  Much of the reason for a 
lack of enthusiasm was due to the costs involved (the issue of costs will be explored 
later in the paper).  In addition, many communities were enrolled in early negotiations 
around the controversial state Slum Rehabilitation Authority Scheme for housing 
relocation, which meant they would have little to gain from the intervention (see 
Mukhija, 2003).  People were also reluctant to move from their homes in order to 
make way for a toilet block, stalling the identification of appropriate sites within 
settlements. 
 
Despite delays, by December 2004 total contracts worth Rs 64 crore (£7.5 million) had 
been awarded for construction of 8,000 toilet seats in 400 toilet blocks spread over the 
24 wards of Mumbai, an average of 20 seats per block (Sharma and Bihde, 2005: 
1787).  On average, that amounts to just under a substantial £940 per seat, although 
one BMC official claimed the figure was closer to £825 per seat.  Although there were 
originally plans for several contractors, there are now just three contractors involved.  
Two of these are engineering firms - Babul Uttamchand (BU), and B. Narayan and 
Associates (BNA), who by October 2004 had been allocated 18% and 13% of the 
work orders issued by the BMC for toilet blocks.  The remaining 69% of the work 
                                                          
3
 Initially, the World Bank condition was that 75% of a community be in favour of the block – the 
Bank later reduced this to 50% following a lack of support. 
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orders were issued to the only NGO on the programme, SPARC, awarded both 
because SPARC‟s bid was the lowest and because of the high profile of the NGO in 
the city and among international donors.  SPARC works as part of a tripartite 
partnership with two CBOs - the National Slum Dwellers Federation (NSDF), and 
Mahila Milan (MM, ‘Women Together’) (Patel, 2001; Patel and Mitlin, 2001).  
SPARC‟s work explores new forms of governance so that, one, the poor can forge 
their own initiatives and, two, the state can be held accountable to the poor (Patel and 
Mitlin, 2001: 5).  The NGO has developed a strong presence in urban politics in 
Mumbai and has expanded nationally and internationally.  As Appadurai (2002: 25) 
has written: “Of the six or seven non-state organizations working directly with the 
urban poor in Mumbai, the Alliance [of SPARC, NSDF, and MM] has by far the 
largest constituency, the highest visibility in the eyes of the state and the most 
extensive networks in India and elsewhere in the world”.   
 
SSP funds are allocated through the BMC on a block by block basis.  SPARC received 
a record 278 work orders covering 20 wards.  This constitutes the largest allocation of 
developmental work by the state to an NGO in India.  BU received work orders for 
three wards and BNA for one ward.  Why was an NGO given such a significant role?  
Part of the answer is SPARC‟s international reputation.  The SPARC leadership has 
contacts and approval at the World Bank and the BMC.  Moreover, SPARC‟s bids 
were almost Rs. 10 million less than any other group‟s tender (Patel and Mitlin, 2004: 
225); another popular but smaller NGO in the city, Youth for Unity and Voluntary 
Action (YUVA), as well as the large NGO, Sulabh International, had their bids 
rejected because SPARC‟s was far lower.  In addition, few other NGOs could claim 
the popular grassroots support that SPARC has in the city, and the SSP was to be 
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rooted in people‟s participation.  There was an assumption made by the Bank and 
BMC that SPARC would be able to speed-up the programme and ensure a greater 
involvement of local people because it was an NGO known for community-based 
work.  For these reasons, not only did SPARC become the only NGO on the project, it 
took on by far the largest share of the work.   
 
However, Sharma and Bihde (2005: 1788) have written, “SPARC faced the uphill task 
of motivating such a large number of households, and also maintaining the target of 
completing the construction work within [the] next six months or so”.  Indeed, in order 
to reach beyond its base and speed up an increasingly delayed programme, SPARC 
sought the assistance of its political contacts.  For example, it contacted Pratishtan, an 
NGO “patronised by a member of Parliament” and invited Antyoday Parishad, 
“another NGO with political patronage – to reach out to the people” (ibid).  Rather 
than using its base to deliver a community-led planned and implemented sanitation 
initiative, the claim made by Sharma and Bihde is that SPARC have effectively 
deployed their political contacts in order to progress work, sometimes to the 
marginalisation of many people within the settlement: 
 
As expected, it would not be easy to vacate people from a few houses, if the space occupied by them 
was required for locating the sanitation blocks.  In such situations, the only way out has been to take 
local political groups into confidence first rather than waiting for the consent of the affected people, and 
relocate them elsewhere.  If the formed CBOs coincide with the existing political groups/associations, 
the results are easily forthcoming.  In fact, as understood from some officials of BMC, in several cases, 
people came to know about construction of toilets in their areas through political groups or formed 
CBOs.  For them, SPARC is more engaged in „fire fighting‟ than a community based approach to the 
SSP.  In some cases, steps are being followed in forming a CBO, collecting upfront contribution and 
registering the CBOs.  In other cases, if this is not materialising, the decisions are being taken to go 
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ahead with the selection of sites and construction of toilets, of course, with the consent of local 
politicians (Sharma and Bhide, 2005: 1788).  
 
Through the course of the SSP, partnership among plural organisations has been 
translated into, in effect, one NGO, while participation has been translated into well-
connected individuals or groups.  In place of local involvement, plans move along 
quickly often without consultation of local people.  Sharma and Bhide (2005) rightly 
argue that no single NGO has the capacity to take on the level of work that SPARC 
took on.  There has been insufficient emphasis in the SSP on working with 
communities at the grassroots, rather than just local leaders.  In addition, participation 
in CBO‟s is often low, and activities are often run through a small CBO that is not 
representative of the community and that may make important decisions without 
consulting others in the local area.   
 
Some CBOs are religiously oriented, with perhaps only 40% of the community 
supporting them, and the processes of deciding who is to be included, commenting on 
design, collecting money, and maintaining the block, can be fraught with conflict 
(MG-YUVA, 2001: 11).  Working with local or political leaders has the effect of 
marginalising those whom they do not represent, particularly given that informal 
settlements are often deeply divided around ethnic, religious, class and economic lines.  
Attention to the power relations within communities, and a more detailed 
understanding people‟s sanitation needs and desires, is important if sanitation delivery 
is to be participatory in practice.  In some settlements, a politics of space effectively 
restricts access for particular ethnic groups or recent migrants.  While SPARC are 
under considerable pressures to mobilise CBO‟s and begin construction quickly, 
Sharma and Bhide‟s (2005) research indicates a need for the project to be more 
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attentive to the social geographies of informal settlements if marginalised groups are 
to become involved.   
 
The SSP raises a question about the dominance of large NGOs in urban development.  
SPARC is a highly connected NGO with excellence in communicating its work.  
However, such a significant presence on the political map of the city leaves little space 
for smaller organisations who may have demonstrated capacities for specific aspects of 
development, from publicity to construction to working with communities.  On 
SPARC, Sharma and Bhide (2005: 1789) go further: “Moreover, there is no criticality 
of reflection in their own style of work.  They determine the boundaries and the 
agendas of the discourse”.  SPARC‟s liberal entrepreneurial politics, which is more 
likely to accommodate the agendas of realpolitik than to contest them with radical 
politics, reduces the space for civil society groups to influence the direction of policy 
and public debate (McFarlane, 2004).  Smaller NGOs in the city spoke in interviews 
about the difficulties of becoming involved in housing or infrastructure projects when 
SPARC are involved.  SPARC have increasingly come to stand for „civil society‟ in 
formal development projects, and the level of influence that they have should act as a 
caution to the role of „super NGOs‟ in other development contexts.  As Sharma and 
Bhide (2005: 1789) conclude: “In this context, when participation takes on a 
consumerist orientation while its other dimensions, e.g., education, empowerment get 
sidelined, change is translated into single-point agendas.  Rather than becoming 
representatives of popular views and opinions, NGOs too seem to be co-opted by the 
system.  There is a need therefore, to review the terms of the discourse and move 
towards plurality”.   
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The SSP could usefully allow space for smaller, more specialised organisations – that 
are not simply divisively associated with particular ethnic, religious or political groups 
in the settlement - to use their expertise in particular settlements in order to broaden 
the level and nature of participation.  This may lead to a longer process, but one that 
draws more fully on the views of people throughout settlements in the design and 
construction of sanitation.  In the next section, I suggest that this plurality must be 
extended not just to the policy infrastructure in the SSP, but also to the technical 
infrastructure.  In the final section, I explore the “consumerist orientation” of the SSP 
in more detail by considering the focus on user charges, and in doing so I reiterate the 
potential need for a more flexible, plural structure. 
 
Technical infrastructure: design and construction 
 
One BMC official on the SSP programme lamented the slow progress of the SSP: 
“[For eight years we have been] struggling to implement the slum sanitation 
programme.  And how much have we done?  Very insignificant – only 328 blocks”.  
Initially, the first phase of the SSP – 325 blocks - was to be completed by 2000, but 
delays pushed this back into December 2005.  By October 2004, according to BMC 
figures, 318 work orders had been given, 274 of which were complete (or 86%).  The 
results have indicated marked improvements in sanitation provision, but beyond the 
delays there are significant technical shortcomings.  70 (25%) of the new blocks 
lacked a water connection and 81 (30%) lacked an electricity connection.  This is 
surprising given that it is typically easier to obtain electricity connections than water 
connections due to its widespread domestic availability.  While one of the strengths of 
the SSP has been its prioritising of water connections, 25% remain unconnected due to 
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the costs involved.  SPARC has not performed as effectively as the two engineering 
firms have, while BU emerges as the strongest performer.  As the previous section 
suggested, SPARC may have been over-stretched by taking on such a large tender.  
Several BMC officials complained that delays and construction difficulties were more 
common with SPARC-built blocks than others, and the stronger performance of the 
other contractors reflects their greater experience in construction and monitoring sub-
contractors.  In rare cases, SPARC-built blocks have not even been opened due to 
unsound construction.  91% of those blocks lacking a water connection were SPARC-
built while 93% of those lacking an electricity connection were SPARC-built.  Table 
1, taken from unpublished BMC data, compares the performance of the three agents 
up to October 2004, and compares the figures for water and electricity connection with 
the situation in 2001
4
. 
 
Table 1: SSP progress until October 2004 
 Work orders 
complete (%) 
Water connection at 
site of completed w.o. 
(%) 
Electricity connection at 
site of completed w.o. 
(%) 
BU 96 95 96 
BNA 92 89 89 
SPARC 82 65 59 
TOTAL 86 75 70 
2001 Total -- 14 39 
 
Clearly, there is a significant improvement on the rate of blocks with water and 
electricity connections (now more than two-thirds).  The completed blocks serve 
almost 300,000 people.  One BMC official argued that the blocks are being widely 
used, but that use depends on three technical features: first, water for flushing, second, 
electricity, and, third, effective maintenance.  He said: “I would not conclude 100% 
                                                          
4
 The 2001 figures are from the MW-YUVA (2001: 35) report. 
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success, but improved [in comparison to blocks in the past]”.  However, these figures 
should be treated with some caution.  The figures say nothing of whether water or 
electricity connections are working in practice, which, due to an inability or reluctance 
to pay bills, they often are not.  In addition, the relationship between water supply and 
the geography of informal settlements effects who benefits from toilet blocks.  For 
example, one difficulty lies in providing water uniformly throughout informal 
settlements – often the geography of water reflects the clustering of economic 
activities, which also often reflects ethnic territories in the settlement.  For instance, in 
Shivaji Nagar, in Govandi in the northeast of the city, the water supply is sufficient in 
the peripheral areas but not in the middle plots of the settlement.  This means that 
while blocks have been built on the relatively more prosperous periphery, people 
living in the centre of the settlement have less access to toilets.  Water tankers, which 
are expensive, are often used to supplement the water supply for blocks.  In addition, 
water „mafias‟ often manipulate water connections and payment systems.  In a 
different settlement in Govandi, water supply to the blocks is reduced because of 
groups who have opened launderettes in the area in order to take advantage of 
subsidised water supply to informal settlements.   
 
Further, the majority of the new toilet blocks are not connected to the sewer system 
because of the amount of time this engineering effort would require, and instead use 
septic tanks that are prone to blocking or over-filling, and are often not cleared.  One 
BMC official estimated that only 28% of SSP toilet blocks are connected to sewers, 
while the figures from 2001 stated coverage of 31% (MW-YUVA, 2001: 35).  If 
correct, then the new SSP blocks are arguably more vulnerable to blockages than those 
in the past.  Some have been arguing for more of an emphasis on sewer connections, 
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but many BMC engineers have replied that sewer connections are a later part of the 
more general World Bank-sponsored sanitation drive in the city, and will be put in 
place when the sewer network is extended.  By this point, some blocks may have lain 
unused for years due to blockages, and may have developed functional problems.  
That sewer connections have been marginalised in the programme is particularly 
unfortunate given the overwhelming global evidence linking higher rates of mortality 
and intestinal parasites among people without access to sewer connections compared 
to those with (UN Habitat, 2003: 79).  The principle of a circulatory network of water 
and sewage which benefits many of the middle and upper classes in the city, has not 
been extended to informal settlements.  
 
Neither do the figures give a breakdown on use of the children‟s squatting platforms.  
According to one BMC official, “almost 60% [of the children‟s platforms] are not in 
use”.  While the children‟s platforms were a condition of World Bank loans, and while 
the SSP survey cited earlier indicated a public preference for children‟s areas, many 
are not used either because in practice mothers want to keep their children in sight or 
because children opt for adult toilets in preference.  In some blocks, water supply to 
the children‟s area has, as a result, been cut-off.  For example, in one block in Santa 
Cruz, a western suburb, the children‟s area is now used as a storage area for 
maintenance accessories.  One local said that it was closed because the children don‟t 
use water to clean the toilet properly after use, and some individuals thought that the 
children‟s area should be removed to make way for additional facilities for women.  
However, because there is no formal attempt by the state to monitor usage, these views 
are not being taken into consideration. 
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Maintenance is emerging as a difficulty in several areas.  Caretakers often cannot 
maintain and clean blocks where the ratio of use is as high as 250 people to one seat.  
Yet one senior engineer at the BMC‟s MSDP said that the MSDP is not monitoring the 
blocks, stating that intervention in areas where CBOs are struggling to maintain blocks 
is “complaint-oriented”: “[Then] we go, and we tell them you should maintain it, you 
should clean it”.  He claimed that this was rarely necessary: “about 1% maybe 
complains”.  This seems unlikely given the amount of difficulties users of SSP toilet 
blocks across the city highlight. 
 
The technical difficulties with the toilet blocks have led several commentators and 
participants in the SSP to criticise the universal „one-size-fits-all‟ approach.  There are 
several cases across the city where people have opted to use older blocks or nearby 
sheltered spaces.  Many local people, as well as some BMC staff, believe that a more 
flexible approach through which sanitation is planned specifically for each settlement 
would be more effective.  While the original SSP plans envisaged a variety of 
sanitation options that would vary according to the contingencies of local geographies 
– from two-floor toilet blocks and twin toilets, to individual toilets and shared toilets, 
where two or three families share toilets through a lock-and-key system and mutual 
maintainance – the programme has become rigidly based around large two- or even 
three-floor structures.  This inflexibility is remarkable when we consider claims that 
the SSP is „demand-driven‟.  One BMC official, commenting on individual toilets, 
said “we should not encourage it”, and cited cases in Dharavi where people 
constructed individual toilets that came out of homes into storm drains.  This, 
however, only highlights the need to link sanitation provision to sewer connections.  
Engineers often argue that in informal settlements, a lack of space within individual 
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houses means that a common toilet block is the only possibility, and it is often 
impossible to lay sewer pipes under a row of houses for individual toilets in a highly 
congested area.  However, where possible individual, twin or shared toilets may 
reduce difficulties around maintenance because they are located within or beside 
homes, creating a distinct incentive for families to maintain them.   The variation in 
the geography of informal settlements is vast, and, as several engineers pointed out 
during the research, there are many sites in the city where different options could be 
developed.  Moreover, people continually put forward preferences for smaller or 
alternative structures.  There are successful examples of this elsewhere in South Asia, 
such as in the work of Orangi Pilot Project, an NGO in Karachi, through which 
latrines and connecting pipes to sewers were installed in homes and lanes (Alimuddin 
et al, 2004).  
 
In the case of individual toilets, it is not necessarily the case, as some have argued, that 
they would be more expensive over the long-term, particularly when it is considered 
that common toilet blocks – currently allocated an average of just under a substantial 
£940 per seat in the SSP - have a history of breaking-down very quickly due to poor 
construction and maintenance.  For example, rudimentary small-scale latrines and 
collector pipes to sewers installed through the work of Anjuman Samaji Behbood in 
Faisalabad, Pakistan, amounted to under £30 per home (Alimuddin et al, 2004: 154).  
Contributions are higher for individual families, meaning that for many poorer people 
individual toilets are not an option if they were forced to pay.  However, there are 
many people that would be able to afford higher costs and who expressed a preference 
for individual toilets in interviews.  Controversially, one BMC official argued that the 
demand for individual, twin or shared toilet blocks is being deliberately suppressed, 
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arguing that the concept of individual toilets is not being marketed because it is not 
“part of the game”.  One claim here, made by others but which requires further 
investigation, is that bureaucrats, politicians, and contractors view large toilet blocks 
as a political investment in informal settlements.  In particular, some more progressive 
BMC officials have argued that politicians are more concerned with associating 
themselves with the provision of common blocks than individual, twin or shared 
toilets because large blocks are highly visible and reach far more voters. 
 
Even though the SSP is designed in part as a shift from services linked to politicians to 
services demanded by communities from bureaucrats, political parties and local BMC 
corporators often try to use toilet blocks as a means of manipulating votes, part of the 
long-established politics of patronage in informal settlements.  As noted earlier, this 
can occur through contacts at SPARC.  Some BMC politicos have actively taken up 
the cause of CBOs and associate themselves with the delivery of new blocks.  In one 
case, a corporator who invested much energy in the scheme publicly associated 
himself with the construction of 13 blocks in informal settlements in his constituency 
through large public events marking the opening of new blocks.   
 
Despite improvements on previous conditions in settlements, and considering the 
importance of sanitation in people‟s everyday lives, the disparity between the level of 
funding and the final results in the SSP points to the need for reflection on strategy.  In 
order to ensure more effective structures over the long-term that reflects the needs and 
desires of local people, it may be that the SSP should be more flexible in order to 
accommodate alternative sanitation options that would vary throughout and between 
settlements, including individual, shared and twin structures.  This may lead to longer 
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time delays, but could also lead to a more effective long-term sanitation provision.  
The experience of toilet blocks since long before the SSP points to the centrality of 
adequate water and electricity supplies for effective functioning of the blocks, and the 
high-pressure of use underlines the need to prioritise sewer connections if blocks are 
to last anywhere near the thirty-year life span that the SSP envisages.  In the final 
section, I consider how user-charges are affecting the performance of the SSP.  
 
Toilets as cash-points? 
  
The solution to the sanitation crisis – at least as conceived by certain economics professors sitting in 
comfortable armchairs in Chicago and Boston – has been to make urban defecation a global business.  
Indeed, one of the great achievements of Washington-sponsored neoliberalism has been to turn public 
toilets into cash points for paying off foreign debts – pay toilets are a growth industry throughout Third 
World slums. 
Mike Davis (2006: 141). 
 
Davis describes public toilets in Ghana, introduced by the military government in 
1981 and privatised in the late 1990s, as a “gold mine” of profitability (Davis, 2006: 
141; Pellow, 2002).  He goes on: “Likewise, in Kenyan slums such as Mathare it costs 
6 cents (US) for every visit to a privatized toilet; this is too expensive for most poor 
people, who would prefer to defecate in the open and spend their money on water and 
food” (Davis, 2006: 141-142)5.  While in the case of Mumbai the toilet blocks in the 
SSP have not been privatised but handed over to „communities‟, the principle of 
paying for use remains.  The focus on cost-recovery from the poor means that 
                                                          
5
 For a discussion of different forms of sanitation construction, management and mantainance globally, 
see UN Habitat (2003: 158-189). 
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sanitation is often provided not according to those who need it most, but according to 
how many people can pay a contribution.  Here, I use a brief discussion of two 
different settlements to reflect on the difficulties of a universal pay-for-use strategy.  
The first is a successful SSP block in the western suburb if Santa Cruz, and the second 
is a site in the northeast in Govandi where some of the first SSP blocks were 
completed. 
 
In an informal settlement in Khotiwadi in Santa Cruz, two SSP blocks are run by a 
local CBO.  The settlement is relatively well off.  It is 45 years old and located on 
BMC land, and there have been state provided toilets in the area for most of that time.  
Today, there is up to 1000 people in the settlement.  Most people work on daily wages, 
and most of the women who work do so by cleaning houses. The male-dominated 
structure of previous community organising has been maintained through a new CBO 
established for the SSP, and has resulted in extra provisions for men over women, 
including individual taps in male toilets and extra seats.   
 
The CBO approached the MSDP in 2002 following initial contact from SPARC.  
Following a feasibility study by an engineer, a two-floor structure of 12 seats was 
recommended (later, an extra two seats were added to the gents, in addition to the 10 
or so urinals already there), and one of the old blocks with six seats was refurbished.  
The ratio of seats to people is 1:55, eased slightly for men with the additional two 
seats they built.  Local people said that queues are not as long as before (when it could 
be over an hour of waiting) and that during busy times of the day, the queues average 
just two or three per seat.   
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Everyday, a private tanker comes to supplement water supply to the blocks.  There are 
three caretakers in total, and the toilets are cleaned twice per day.  The CBO obtains 
Rs. 120 per family per year, varying between Rs. 10 and Rs. 20 per month per family, 
and up to Rs. 50 from larger families.  Family passes were issued in the beginning as 
per SSP guidelines.  Hundreds of outsiders use the toilet every day (the block is near a 
busy road), from 6am until midnight, and are charged Rs. 2 per person.  The 
committee are volunteers and do not get paid, and they have applied for an income tax 
exemption because the CBO is a registered charity.  In addition, there are activities 
attached to the large block.  For example, 200 students from around the area attend 
basic computer classes on the second floor, including poor and middle-class groups.  
Individuals are charged Rs. 750 for the three-month class.  Yet, the president insisted 
that the block runs at a loss.  He pointed to the electricity bill - the bill was over two 
months (the first month hadn‟t been paid), from November to January 2006, and the 
total was Rs. 6540.  The committee claimed it was too high, especially when added to 
water charges, sewer line charges and maintenance costs.   
 
While I did not have access to the details of these accounts, it is unlikely that the 
income generated cannot meet these costs.  During the course of research, various 
reliable sources, from independent commentators to state officials, claimed that there 
are cases of local CBOs – or more correctly those who run CBOs - making an 
undeclared profit from toilet blocks, particularly those blocks located near busy roads 
where outside passers-by often pay to use.  A lack of accountability makes this 
difficult to corroborate.  However, in interviews with people in Khotiwadi, it became 
clear that not only were people happy to pay towards toilet blocks, most did not care if 
undeclared profits were being made provided that the service is affordable and well 
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run.  People would often begin by contrasting the new with the old blocks.  One older 
couple said that the old blocks were unclean and often blocked, and that there were 
often queues of up to 30 people at busy times because of a lack of seats.  They didn‟t 
pay for maintenance of those blocks, and while they now pay Rs. 10 every month 
each, the blocks are kept clean and are without blockages.  They said that as far they 
know, the money was going to cleaning only, adding: “Why should we bother with 
their [the committee‟s] business?...We are getting it cheaply.  They are doing good, so 
why should we bother with them?”  Their view was that given that toilets were 
previously in a very poor condition, they wouldn‟t care if funds were going missing as 
long as the blocks are well maintained.  
 
This view was shared by others.  One family, where the father works for the Bombay 
Port Trust as a marine engineer driver earning a relatively high Rs 20,000 per month, 
pay a flat Rs 120 per year towards maintenance, and do not give the costs any more 
thought as long as maintenance is effective.  Again, they emphasised the contrast with 
the past, where women might queue from 6am to 8am to use dirty toilets.  Often, 
people would defecate in any sheltered ground around the settlement.  Now, caretakers 
clean daily, and they are pleased with the results, adding that the area where the new 
block is located was previously a garbage area.  They said they are not interested 
where the money is going, as long as the blocks are kept clean.  They had never seen 
any accounts, but added that have had positive contact with the committee members, 
many of whom they know as neighbours.  They have found the committee responsive 
to minor requests, ranging from complaints about graffiti to broken buckets.  
 
The SSP initiative at Khotiwadi has become a flagship for the SSP, and it has 
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generated a great deal of interest.  The visitor book is filled with praiseworthy 
comments from policy-makers and donor organisations from across the world.  People 
are content to pay contributions for an improved service.  If there are questions about 
the use of funds, locals are generally not interested in them.  Khotiwadi is an 
established, authorised informal settlement made up of relatively well off families 
living in pukka (concrete) housing.  How sustainable is cost-recovery in different parts 
of the city where families are less well off?  What is the pattern of use in those areas?  
Any temptation to conclude that cost recovery is a workable solution for cash-
scrapped municipal governments must take into account the nature of cost recovery as 
it operates in a variety of different urban contexts. 
 
For example, Rafi Nagar in Govandi, is one of the poorest unauthorised informal 
settlements in the city.  The settlement is located on BMC land and is subject to 
frequent bouts of demolition, never with any offer of resettlement and rarely with 
warning.  The housing in the area is constituted through tin, corrugated iron and 
plastic, and employment is mostly informal.  Many people „ragpick‟ on the dumping 
ground next to which the settlement is based, earning between Rs. 30 and Rs. 50 per 
day.  This includes children, who sometimes don‟t get paid at all, none of whom attend 
school.  Many of the women previously worked in dance bars before the bars were 
banned by the state government, since which some of have entered prostitution. The 
people in this settlement suffer major health problems – the settlement is severely 
unhygienic, and the dumping ground is literally on their doorstep.  TB, HIV/AIDS, 
malaria, anemia, malnutrition, asthma and bronchitis in part due to fumes from the 
dumping ground, and intestinal illnesses, are all very common.  There are two SSP 
blocks in the area.  Each has 12 male and 12 female seats.  People who pay 
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maintenance have a „family pass‟ and pay Rs. 10 per adult per month, otherwise it‟s 
Rs. 1 per use.  These are the only blocks in an area of 20,000 people, and there are no 
plans for new blocks.   
 
Most of the relatively wealthier individuals in the area use the blocks, and they are 
well maintained by local caretakers despite the pressure of use.  Water and sanitation 
constitutes the biggest monthly outlays for many people, not to mention the costs spent 
on health problems caused by the inadequacy of these basic requirements.  In practice, 
while the blocks are in good maintenance, the combination of cost and long queues 
means that most people do not use them and instead use the nearby dumping ground.  
In Rafi Nagar, attempts to „clean‟ the settlement veer between violence (demolition) 
and regulation (SSP blocks), between the legal and illegal.  Public health is very poor 
and toilet facilities are either insufficient or makeshift and dangerous dumping 
grounds.  In this context, we are forced to ask whether people who can barely afford 
sanitation but yet desperately seek it, to not just „demand‟ it, as the SSP guidelines 
insist, but to demand to pay for it, constitutes a logical development strategy. 
 
People in this context are often more concerned about how their contributions are 
being used than those living in Khotiwadi, and many complained about having to pay 
from very low budgets.  In this context, the SSP is a very partial sanitation solution, 
and in practice cost recovery can remove the option.  In addition, in the many areas 
throughout the city where the blocks are poorly maintained despite high-levels of 
contributions from locals and outsiders, local tensions can result or become 
exacerbated.  It is perhaps only in settlements like Khotiwadi, relatively well off with 
low pressure on well-maintained toilet blocks, that people are content with paying and 
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have the luxury of being unconcerned about the use of funds.  In addition, there are 
questions around who should and who should not be made to pay for use.  For 
example, SSP rules mean that labourers who work in settlements but do not live there 
cannot be issued with family passes, and instead must pay per use.    
 
According to research carried out by the Tata Institute of Social Sciences (TISS) as the 
SSP was launched, most people living in informal settlements expect sanitation 
delivery to be, as it has often been, free (Tata, 1998).  The shift from paying for toilets 
through votes to paying through cash is a shift that can lead to the marginalisation of 
poorer people.  I am not arguing here that a system of cost-recovery should necessarily 
be abandoned in Mumbai, but that the realities of specific settlements need to be taken 
into account.  In order to reach higher numbers, many settlements or parts of 
settlements could require full subsidies.  Just as difficulties with the policy and 
technical infrastructures in the SSP suggest that greater flexibility is required in order 
to reflect the plurality of the informal settlements in the city, the case of Rafi Nagar 
suggests that flexibility in the administration of costs and subsidies may be necessary. 
  
Conclusion 
 
Most people care little about who is maintaining blocks as long as they are being 
maintained, whether it is a political party, BMC staff, or a local CBO.  As long as 
blocks are, first, well maintained, second, of adequate number, and, third, affordable, 
then on the whole people use them with few complaints.  In one settlement in the 
western suburb of Bandra, for example, people said that they were not concerned that 
the (non-SSP) blocks were maintained by the Congress Party, as long as they were 
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kept in the condition they were in.  One advantage to the SSP, however, is that it offers 
the potential to deliver a service outside of the patronage politics between politician or 
party and informal settlement, although in practice parties often play a role.  However, 
while there has been significant improvement in sanitation delivery, getting all three of 
these factors to work together is a huge challenge.  Without being prescriptive, the 
issues raised here tentatively suggest that a greater flexibility in the SSP may be 
required in order to reflect the varied geographies of informal settlements, the ordinary 
spaces of urban development.  It is hoped that these reflections contribute to debate on 
the programme. 
 
First, the discussion of partnership and participation indicates that flexibility could 
allow a more plural policy infrastructure.  The SSP could usefully make its tendering 
process more flexible to enable smaller NGOs to bid for smaller contracts, rather than 
simply favouring large contracts and NGOs.  This could make space for smaller 
organisations with a greater familiarity with particular settlements, and that are not 
divisively associated with particular groups, to use their local expertise to extend 
participation and maximise the sanitation needs of these settlements.  The presence of 
large „super NGOs‟ on the political map of the city leaves little space for smaller 
organisations that may have demonstrated capacities for specific aspects of 
development, from publicity to construction to working with communities.  In 
addition, in the case of SPARC, an organisation that has increasingly come to stand for 
„civil society‟ in urban development projects in Mumbai, its liberal entrepreneurial 
politics are more likely to accommodate the agendas of realpolitik than to contest them 
with radical politics (McFarlane, 20004).  This reduces the space for other civil society 
groups to influence the direction of policy and public debate.  Second, the discussion 
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of technical infrastructure production indicates that the programme could usefully be 
more driven around the needs, constitution and geography of specific settlements.  
This could result in more effective results over the long term, including individual, 
twin and shared toilets rather than simply large common blocks.   
 
Third, the discussion of cost recovery suggests caution.  In particular, there may be a 
requirement for full subsidies in areas that clearly cannot afford to spare money (as in 
the case of Rafi Nagar) if sanitation delivery is to reach poorer groups.  In addition, it 
is worth considering more effective monitoring of how contributions are being used 
locally, as well as more general monitoring of user and non-user views on sanitation.  
Large „super NGOs‟ do not necessarily bring accountability anymore than they 
necessarily contribute a fuller understanding of community needs.  While the SSP, in 
contrast to Mehta‟s bleak prediction, has significantly improved sanitation in informal 
settlements, the issues raised here suggest that the programme could be more effective 
if it was based on a greater engagement with local people.   
 
The SSP distinguishes itself from the previous ad hoc model of sanitation provision 
that Chatterjee (2004) describes in that it is a citywide, long-term project to improve 
informal settlements.  Its emphasis on community responsibility marks a shift from his 
notion of intervention in „slums‟ as a calibration of rewards and costs towards a 
construct of citizenship rights and responsibilities.  The SSP is in part an attempt to 
foster a particular kind of civic consciousness of community responsibility deemed 
lacking among those living in informal settlements.  To this extent it is an attempt to 
instil a particular sense of urban modernity which echoes nationalist discourses in the 
early years of Independence (Chakrabarty, 2002).  However, in this construction, the 
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„nonbourgeoise subaltern‟ is, in Chakrabarty‟s (2002: 69) phrasing, “always already 
condemned”.  The subaltern is condemned as lacking the sense of civic consciousness 
viewed as integral to the making of a modern city: the view peddled in the media and 
among many neighbourhood improvement groups is often that it is their fault that 
sanitation is the way it is, and if things don‟t improve then it is they who are to blame.  
For example, some BMC officials complained that one of the reasons for health 
problems among the poor is a lack of “discipline”, or the wrong “mentality”.  These 
perceptions often act as an explanation for emerging shortcomings in „community‟ 
maintenance.  In this act of condemnation, the „slum‟ remains fixed to the terrain of 
„population‟, without any inherent moral claim on the state.  „Slums‟ remain 
populations outside of the sphere of citizenship, outside of discourses of rights, and 
remain in the view of these officials and many others in the city a necessary scourge 
on visions of the modern, clean and ordered city.  
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